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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

DANNY L. HERRING,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930006-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury
of tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.

In

reviewing a jury verdict, this Court views the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
verdict and will only interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that a reasonable jury could not possibly have
reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Burk,

839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993); State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App.
1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Danny Herring was charged by information with
witness tampering, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1990) (R. 1). A jury found him guilty as
charged, and the court ordered a presentence report prepared (R.
66, 47). The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years, to run
consecutively with the sentence he was then serving on other
charges (R. 73-74).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.

State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah

App. 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1992),
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Troy Lott, a long-time friend of defendant's, was the
victim and principle witness in a previous trial in which
defendant was tried on assault-related charges (R. 5, 10; Trial
Transcript [hereinafter nTr.n] 6-7). At the preliminary hearing
in the assault matter, Lott testified that defendant had kicked
him in the face (Tr. 6-7, 9, 10, 12, 14-15, 35-36).

The

afternoon before the assault trial, defendant telephoned Lott
solely to discuss the next day's trial (Tr. 5-6, 21-22, 27).
2

With no preliminary conversation, defendant asked if Lott was
going to testify at the trial the following day (Tr. 6, 13).
Lott replied that he was going to appear and testify (Tr. 13-14).
When defendant asked what Lott was going to say, Lott responded
that he "was going to tell the truth, the same thing [he] said in
the preliminary [hearing.]" (Tr. 7, 14). Defendant claimed that
he could not remember kicking Lott and asked whether it might
have happened differently (Tr. 7, 14, 16, 37) . Lott responded
that he not only remembered defendant kicking him, but that he
would say so at trial (Tr. 7, 14-16).

Defendant remarked that it

would help him out if Lott did not say that at trial (Tr. 7, 15) .
He then stated that Lott would be better off if he did not
testify or defendant would bring up a murder Lott had allegedly
confessed to several months earlier (Tr. 8, 15, 17).x Both men
then hung up (Tr. 8, 16-17, 31). Lott immediately reported the
phone call to the police (Tr. 21-22).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial, together with all
reasonable inferences, was sufficient to establish thfct
defendant, believing that an official proceeding was pending,

1

Although defendant remembered the details of the phone
conversation differently, he admitting bringing up the subject of
the murder (Tr. 28-29) . He claimed that when he reminded Lott
about an earlier conversation in which Lott allegedly said that he
did not remember defendant kicking him in the head, Lott responded
that he did not remember saying that (Tr. 28) .
Lott then
commented, "I think you know that you kicked me in the head twice
and I think you ought to think about that[,]" to which defendant
responded, "Well, I think you ought to think about the gun spree
you told me about" (Tr. 28-29).

3

attempted to induce or otherwise cause a witness to withhold
testimony or information.

Accordingly, the jury had sufficient

evidence on which to base its conviction of defendant for
tampering with a witness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS
Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
prove that defendant, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation was pending or was about to be instituted,
attempted to induce or otherwise cause Lott to withhold any
testimony, information, or item.
508(1) (b) (1990). 2

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-

Relying on the dissenting opinion in State

v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 888-89

(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853

P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), defendant contends that the language used
by defendant amounted to a mere expression of his belief that his
own interests would not be served by Lott's proposed testimony,

2

Section 76-8-508 provides in pertinent part:

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce
or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold
any
testimony,
information,
document, item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to
provide evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or
investigation to which he has been summoned.

4

and that defendant's language, which was devoid of threats,
promises, or extended argument, did not amount to inducement to
change or withhold testimony.

Br. of App. at 11-16.

This Court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence
under a well-settled standard:
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences
which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,
1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,
1147 (Utah 1989))).
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence establishing his belief that an official proceeding or
investigation was pending.

He challenges only the evidence

establishing his attempt to induce or otherwise cause Lott to
withhold any testimony, information, or item.

Lott related his

phone conversation with defendant as follows:
Q [DEFENSE COUNSEL]. . . . But as best you can
remember the exact words, what did [defendant] say when
he brought the subject up?
A [LOTT].
Q.

The subject of?

Of testifying.

A. He asked me if I was going to testify.
him yes, I was.

5

I told

[He a]sked me what I was going to say. I said I
was going to tell the truth, the same thing I said in
the pretrial.

He told me he couldn't remember kicking me in the
face. Asked me if I might have done it when I jumped
in the back of the truck. I told him, "No, Danny[,]
you kicked me in the face, and I remember and I'm going
to tell it the same as I did in the pretrial.If
Q.

And what was the next thing that was said?

A. Well, he said it would really help him out a
lot if I didn't testify to that.
Q.
memory?

Were those his words to the best of your

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did you say?

A. I didn't say nothing. Then he just -- that's
when he brought up the card game and Pleasant Grove.
(Tr. 13-16).

Lott detailed the remark concerning Pleasant Grove

at another point in the examination:
A. [Defendant] brought up a time of we was having
a party at a friend's house in Pleasant Grove, and I
guess I'd told him about a shooting spree or something.
He brought that up and said if I was to testify
tomorrow, I'd be better off if I didn't testify
tomorrow or he would bring that up.
(Tr. 8). 3
3

The "shooting spree" included an alleged murder.
The
testimony indicated that one night several months before the
disputed phone conversation with Lott, defendant and Lott were
doing a lot of drinking at a party in Pleasant Grove when Lott had
told defendant about a shooting spree Lott had been involved in
(Tr. 8, 17, 29) . Lott claimed that several months earlier, he and
a couple of his friends were drinking and driving around a rural
area shooting "whatever was moving" (Tr. 30).
They were
interrupted by a man who demanded to know why they were shooting
his coyote (Tr. 30-31). Because Lott and his friends didn't want
to get in trouble, they allegedly shot the man, put him in the back
6

Defendant breaks the conversation into five individual
pieces, characterizing defendant's questions largely as harmless
inquiries or appropriate interrogation to be made of witnesses
following any preliminary hearing.

He contends that the final

statement threatening to incriminate Lott in a murder cannot
support the conviction when "viewed in the light of [the
parties'] relationship and the Defendant's perception of [Lott's]
rudeness[.],f

Br. at 15. However, this Court reviews the

evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

Burk,

839 P.2d at 884. By rendering the guilty verdict, the jury
rejected defendant's perception of the conversation.

Moreover,

the questions in this case were posed not by an attorney but by
the accused on his own initiative immediately before trial. The
evidence, examined in the proper light, is sufficient to support
defendant's conviction.
The testimony indicated that defendant called the
State's key witness the afternoon before trial for the sole
purpose of discussing the testimony.

Defendant elicited the fact

that Lott intended to appear at trial and that his testimony
would parrot his incriminating testimony at the preliminary
hearing.

Defendant then suggested another scenario for Lott's

injury, which Lott refused to accept.

Immediately thereafter,

defendant stated that Lott's testimony would be detrimental not
only to defendant, but to Lott as well, explaining that if Lott

of their truck, tied an anchor to him, and threw him into the lake
(Tr. 30-31).
7

testified at the trial, defendant would implicate Lott in a
murder.

This express type of cause-and-effect statement

constitutes the tangible indicia of inducement required by the
dissent in Burk, upon which defendant relies,

839 P.2d at 889.

It may reasonably be viewed as a threat and was, in fact,
reported to the police by Lott as a threat accompanied by a
request "to testify to something other than what he had testified
in the preliminary hearing."

(Tr. 22). Defendant believed that

Lott may well have been involved in a murder (Tr. 29, 31-32, 41),
and, although defendant knew that he had already reported the
murder story to the authorities, his threat falsely suggested to
Lott that he had not yet said anything to anyone (Tr. 31, 39-41).
From the testimony before it, the jury may reasonably have
determined that defendant made the statement to Lott, not as a
reflexive retort to perceived rudeness, but on the chance that
the murder story was true and that Lott would be intimidated to
change his testimony to avoid having his participation in the
murder made public.
Moreover, Lott testified that he had been intimidated
by defendant's suggestion that if Lott incriminated defendant,
defendant would retaliate in kind, despite the fact that Lott
ultimately appeared at trial and testified against defendant (Tr.
9, 18-19).

Because Utah's witness tampering statute does not

require that the witness be affected by the attempted inducement,
the affect on the witness is not necessarily dispositive of an
accused's culpability.

See State v. Remoel, 785 P.2d 1134, 1137
•

t

(Wash. 1990) (involving a statute similar to Utah's).
the affect may prove relevant.

However,

See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d

422, 424 (Utah App. 1989) (conviction supported, in part, by
witness' withholding of a report from a legal proceeding because
comments from defendant made the witness worry that production of
the report would cause trouble for defendant), cert, denied, 783
P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).

Here, the jury could reasonably have found

that the threat of being implicated in a murder is likely to
result in some degree of intimidation, and that Lott's
intimidation, although not sufficient to change his testimony,
was at least a foreseeable, if not an intentional, result of
defendant's threat.
Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support
defendant's conviction for tampering with a witness.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
j

sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£)

day of October, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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